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ABSTRACT: This paper proposes a simple political economic model of public opinion support for 
the EU, drawing on the recent economic literature on integration processes. The basic element is the 
existence of a trade-off between the benefits of centralisation and the costs of harmonising policies 
in the presence of heterogeneous preferences among countries. Subsequently we test the model with 
panel data on the EU member countries. The findings broadly confirm that economic benefits and 
costs do consistently shape citizens’ attitude towards EU membership. Our analysis may thus shed 
some light also on the awkward process of ratification of the European Constitution. 
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The role of public opinion in the process of European economic and political integration has so 
far been neglected by economists, whereas international relations scholars have been paying it 
increasing attention in the last fifteen years, because the implementation of international bargains 
struck by governments often requires domestic support, as the use of referendum in some member 
states clearly demonstrates. What are the factors that influence public opinion support for the 
European Union (EU)? Following theories of utilitarian support, we assume that citizens are in 
favour of membership if they receive economic benefits from it. To develop this idea, we propose a 
simple political economic model drawing on the recent economic literature on integration and 
disintegration processes. The basic element is the existence of a trade-off between the benefits of 
centralisation and the costs of harmonising policies in the presence of heterogeneous preferences 
among countries. 
Subsequently we empirically test the model with data on the EU; more precisely, we perform an 
econometric analysis employing a panel of member countries over time. The second part of the 
paper therefore tries to answer the following question: does public opinion support for the EU really 
depend on economic factors? The findings broadly confirm that economic benefits and costs do 
consistently shape citizens’ attitude towards EU membership, even if some differences over time 
and across countries can be noted. Consequently, the key to regain the significant amount of support 
lost in the last fifteen years is to be found in economic policies effectively promoting growth and 
employment. Our analysis may thus shed some light also on the awkward process of ratification of 
the European Constitution. Citizens in many member states are called to express their opinion in 
national referenda, which may well end up in rejection of the Constitution, as recently happened in 
France and the Netherlands, triggering a European-wide political crisis. These events show that 
nowadays understanding public attitude towards the EU is not only of academic interest, but has a 
strong relevance for policy-making too. 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses the relevance of public opinion in the 
process of European integration and provides a concise historical overview of the evolution of 
public support for the EU. Section 3 presents a political economic model of citizens’ support for 
membership of the EU. Section 4 presents the estimation of the model and its results. Section 5 
discusses the relevance of our findings for the present debate about ratification of the European 
Constitution and the future of public attitude towards the EU. Section 6 briefly concludes. 
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2. The Relevance of Public Opinion for European Integration 
 
The process of creation and development of the EU was traditionally viewed as an elite-driven 
process by the two leading theories of European integration, neofunctionalism (Haas 1958, 1964; 
Lindberg 1963) and intergovernmentalism (Hoffmann 1966), the former emphasising the role of 
supranational institutions, the latter that of national governments. Public opinion was not considered 
as a relevant actor and was assumed to show a passive attitude towards the integration process, 
sometimes referred to as “permissive consensus” (Lindberg and Scheingold 1970). This concept 
indicated that citizens in member states were either not interested in European affairs or generally 
supported actions to promote integration, but attributed them low political salience.  
The role of public opinion in the process of European integration has been paid increasing 
attention by international relations scholars in the last fifteen years (to mention only a few studies, 
Reif and Inglehart 1991; Franklin et al. 1994; Anderson 1998; Gabel 1998a; Gilland 2002), starting 
from the observation that attempts to achieve international cooperation often involve domestic 
ratification of international bargains.
1 Indeed, we have witnessed an increasing use of the 
referendum in some member countries as an instrument for ratification of new treaties negotiated by 
national governments: the Single European Act (1986), the Maastricht Treaty (1992), the 
Amsterdam Treaty (1997) and the Nice Treaty (2001)
2, as documented in Table 1. The outcome has 
generally been positive, but  in two cases a treaty was firstly rejected (the Maastricht Treaty in 
Denmark and the Nice Treaty in Ireland), then approved in a second referendum after some more 
concessions or clarifications. Referenda have also been held in Denmark and Sweden on a specific 
European issue, namely the adoption of the euro; in both cases, the majority of citizens voted 
against it. The two most recent enlargement rounds have been accompanied by referenda in all 
accession countries (except for Cyprus); in 1994, the Norwegian citizens decided that their country 
would not become a member of the EU after their government had signed the accession treaty 
(Table 2).  
Moreover, in 2005 some countries held referenda on the recently agreed “Treaty Establishing a 
Constitution for Europe” (the so-called “European Constitution”). Spain and Luxembourg approved 
it, but France and the Netherlands rejected it, opening a serious political crisis in the EU and 
probably causing the death of the Treaty itself (Table 1).  
<Tables 1 and 2 here> 
                                                 
1 The seminal work on this subject is Putnam (1988). 
2 The years in parentheses refer to the signature of the treaties.   4 
It seems therefore correct to argue that ‘European mass publics have the ability and the 
willingness to constrain and possibly forestall further progress toward a unified Europe’ (Anderson 
1998, p.570). The relevance of the role played by public opinion in the current phase of European 
integration stimulates the analysis of the determinants of citizens’ support for the EU. A well-
established concept in international relations theory is that of ‘utilitarian support’ (Easton 1965, 
1975): an individual supports a certain political system if she believes that it promotes her own 
economic (or political) interests. By applying this concept to an international union like the EU, one 
can argue that people are in favour of European integration if it has been making them better off.  
Comparative public opinion research is often subject to a host of potential problems involving the 
measurement of citizens’ opinions, such as variations in question  wording across different studies, 
irregularity in the timing or frequency of surveys, and so on. In the case of public support for European 
integration, the Eurobarometer surveys enable us to avoid these problems. Indeed, since 1973 the 
European Commission has regularly undertaken these semiannual European-wide opinion polls (in 
spring and in autumn)
3, conducted by private polling agencies in each member state through 
interviews of a sample of approximately 1000 people in each country (Gabel 1998b; Hix 1999) 
The Eurobarometer surveys ask a series of identical questions about public support for the EU 
and the integration process. We can therefore analyse public attitudes towards the EU, using a 
standard question that has been regularly repeated in each member state. This permits meaningful 
cross-national and cross-temporal comparisons of data. Throughout this paper, we will use the 
following measure of public support for the EU: the percentage of people answering ‘a good thing’ 
to the question: ‘Generally speaking, do you think that (your country’s) membership of the 
European Union/Community is a good thing, a bad thing, neither good nor bad?’  
Figure 1 depicts the evolution of the percentage of EU citizens supporting their country’s 
membership of the EU, from autumn 1973 to autumn 2003, and claiming that their country has 
benefited from EU membership, from spring 1984 (when a question about membership benefits 
started to be regularly asked) to autumn 2003. No single trend for the whole period can be detected. 
Support for membership was slightly declining over the 1970s and reached a minimum of 50% in 
1981, then it rose significantly throughout the 1980s, reaching an historical maximum of 72% in 
1991. Afterwards, it fell dramatically down to 46% in 1997
4, then it followed an erratic path within 
a 48-55% range. The most significant finding emerging from Figure 1 is that opinions about 
                                                 
3 In the following figures, the suffix S after a date will indicate ‘spring issue’ and the suffix A ‘autumn issue’ of the 
Eurobarometer surveys. 
4 The entry of Austria, Finland and Sweden in 1995 (three countries showing a very low level of support for 
membership) significantly contributed to the lowering of this figure.   5 
benefits followed a very similar path: indeed the correlation coefficient between the two series is 
0.84. 
<Figure 1 here> 
The idea of utilitarian support appears therefore consistent with the findings of the 
Eurobarometer, and is very interesting from an economic perspective, because it permits to 
establish a relation between the observable performance of economic variables and citizens’ support 
for integration.  
Indeed, the EU has had and still has, first, an economic nature. However, economic integration 
has not made member states irrelevant in the eyes of public opinion. To evaluate the impact of EU 
activity on their well-being, citizens of, say, Italy are not interested in the economic performance of 
the EU as a whole, but in that of the Italian economy. Despite the integrated nature of the European 
market and of some EU policy programs, therefore, the performance of the market is still measured 
at the national level. Actually, the promise of increased prosperity and employment through the 
gains from free trade has been the most prominent argument offered in support of the original 
Common Market and then the Single Market (Tsoukalis 1997). As argued by Eichenberg and 
Dalton (1993), ‘if the EC has promised anything, it has promised the enhancement of member 
states’ national economic welfare’ (p. 510). 
Public opinion support for European integration is thus influenced by factors that occur at the 
national level. Using a metaphor, one might say that the image of the EU is filtered through national 
lenses. More precisely, the hypothesis is that citizens of a member state realise that the EU does 
affect their economic welfare and they make it a target of their evaluation, which, however, is based 
on the performance of their own national economy. Support for the EU is higher (lower) when the 
national economy is doing well (badly). In other words, it is assumed that public opinion perceives 
that the national economy is influenced by membership of the EU.
5 
While the importance of economic conditions as a basis for citizens’ evaluation of national 
political institutions is well-documented in the political business cycle literature (Alesina et al. 
1997), only a small number of studies in the 1990s have investigated the link between national 
economic performance and mass support for European integration (Eichenberg and Dalton 1993; 
Anderson and Kalthenthaler 1996). These articles draw upon theories of economic voting (Lewis-
Beck 1988; Norpoth et al. 1991), but only make informal assumptions and are mainly empirical
6. 
To the best of our knowledge, this topic has never been the subject of a formal treatment. Indeed, 
usual formal models of political business cycle at the national level are not well suited for the EU 
                                                 
5 This assumption does not require public opinion to have an exact knowledge of how the EU works and what its 
competencies and activity are, which would be definitely unrealistic. 
6 The findings of these studies will be discussed in Section 4.    6 
level, because there is no EU-wide political cycle between two subsequent elections. Citizens do not 
periodically vote on membership of the EU and the European elections obviously cannot be 
considered as equivalent to national elections, because their aim is not that of choosing a European 
government. A different approach is thus required to study the effect of economic conditions on 
public opinion support for the EU. 
 
3. The Model 
 
The approach we will follow is that of the recent literature on the political economy of 
international unions and the unification or break-up of nations (Bolton and Roland 1997, Alesina 
and Wacziarg 1999, Alesina et al. 2001, 2005a, to mention only the most relevant). Here we 
emphasise some basic features which may be relevant to the modelling of public opinion support 
for the EU. The general perspective is that unification provides returns to scale in the provision of 
public goods, but reduces each member state’s ability to determine its most favoured bundle of 
public goods. These papers focus on a trade-off between the benefits of centralization, arising from 
economies of scale or externalities, and the costs of harmonizing policies as a consequence of the 
increased heterogeneity of countries' (or regions') preferences in a union. Alesina et al. (2001) argue 
that ‘the core of our model, and an element that in our view is central to the political economy of all 
unions [...], is the existence of a tension between the heterogeneity of individual countries’ 
preferences and the advantage of taking certain decision in common’ (p. 4). 
Bolton and Roland (1997) employ heterogeneity in economic fundamentals (income or 
productivity) and distortionary taxation to study the conditions under which a majority in favour of 
secession (or unification) arises in the regions of a democratic country. Alesina et al. (2001, 2005a) 
analyse the determinants of the degree of centralisation and the size of international unions by 
modelling a union as a group of countries deciding together on the provision of public goods or 
policies which produce a spillover effect across members.  
These papers do not deal explicitly with the issue of mass support for membership of an 
international union, but their reasoning can be extended to include it. The model presented in this 
section is a modified version of that proposed by Bolton and Roland (1997), explicitly taking 
heterogeneity in preferences among countries into account. 
While they focus on a country made up of two regions, we consider here a union composed of n 
countries. The population and capital in a generic member country i are indicated by Li and Ki; total 
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We assume perfectly competitive labour and capital markets in each country i. Productive factors 
are mobile inside countries, but not across them. Therefore the equilibrium real rate of return on 
capital ri and the equilibrium real wage si are: 
ri = a(yi/ki)  and  si = (1-a)yi                  (2) 
Individuals differ in their labour and capital endowment; hence an individual v in country i will 
have an income of: 
wvi = siLvi + riKvi                     (3) 
The income distribution in each country  i is given by a density function  zi(wv); thus 
? ) ( = ) (
i
v i v w z w z  is the income distribution in the whole union, with support  ] , 0 [ w . Total output 
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The differences between regions are fully summed up by differences in factor returns (determined 
by the absence of factor mobility) and in income distribution. 
The assumption of factor immobility may sound quite inaccurate in the case of an international 
union like the EU and thus needs explaining. First, labour mobility among EU countries is actually 
very low (Hantrais 2000). Capital mobility is much more intense, but it can be easily shown that 
introducing it in our framework would lead to more unrealistic results. Indeed capital mobility 
would imply that ri = r for any i=1,..., n. Since it follows from (1) and (2) that  1 - = a
i i k a r , then we 
would obtain equal capital-output ratio  k, equal per capita income  y and equal wage  s in all 
countries in equilibrium, while distribution of income could still differ among countries. At present, 
by contrast, we observe very large differences in per capita income, even when expressed in 
purchasing power parity, among EU countries: the richest member country (Luxembourg) is about 
five times wealthier than the poorest one (Latvia)
7. Second, and most important, the fundamental 
element characterising the union in this model is the common provision of a public good Gu, which 
does not require factor mobility to be implemented. 
Following Alesina et al. (2001), Gu can be interpreted in a broad sense as a common policy (not 
only in the economic field, but also in areas like social policy or defence), where for each country 
                                                 
7 If one only takes the "old" fifteen members into account, Luxembourg is about three times richer than the poorest 
country (Portugal).    8 
the benefits of centralisation derive from the exploitation of economies of scale or externalities, 
while the costs are represented by the loss of independent policy-making. 
The provision of the public good is financed through a linear income tax; in per capita terms, 
this imply: 
gu = tuyu                          (5) 
where tu is the union’s tax rate. An individual’s utility is defined over the consumption of a private 
good cvi and the public good gu. To keep things as simple as possible, the individual utility function 
assumes the following form:  
) log( + log = ) ( + ) ( = ) , ( u i vi u vi v u vi
IN
vi g ß c g H c u g c U             (6) 
where the superscript IN means “when country i is a member of the union”.  ] 1 , 0 [ ? i ß is a parameter 
capturing the heterogeneity in preferences over the public good among countries. The lower ßi, the 
higher the cost deriving from the loss of independent policy-making for country i.
8   
The most preferred per capita amount of public good for an individual with income wvi is given 
by the solution to the following problem: 
 
[ ] ) log( + log max u i vi
g
g ß c                     (7) 
s.t. cvi = (1-tu)wvi and gu = tuyu                             (8) 
By substituting (8) in (7), we find that the optimum per capita amount of public good is: 
2
= ) ( * u
vi u
y
w g                         (9) 
which is independent of wvi and therefore is the same for all individuals in the union. Hence (9) is 
the per capita amount of public good provided by the union, with an equilibrium tax rate of 0.5. An 
agent with income wvi receives the following payoff when her country is inside the union: 
u i vi vi
IN
vi y ß w w U log + log + log = ) ( -2log2              (10) 
Now we have to find what the utility of the individuals would be if country i were not a member 
of the union. In such case, the public good gi is autonomously provided in country i and therefore 
there are no heterogeneity costs. However, the absence of integration carries a different kind of 
cost: an efficiency loss for the national economy, since potential  benefits from international 
coordination are missing. For instance, imagine the simple case of a free trade area: as noticed by 
Bolton and Roland (1997), production costs and consumer prices in a country may be higher when 
it is outside the union than when it is inside, because its trade with the members of the free trade 
                                                 
8 Alternatively, we may think of ßi as of the extent of the spillover effect in the provision of the public good at the union 
level. In this case, the higher ßi, the higher the benefits of centralisation.   9 
area is lower. To put it bluntly, the better (worse) the performance of the national economy inside 
the union, the higher (lower) the cost that being outside the union would entail. 
To model this effect, we assume that outside the union individuals get a pre-tax income of only 
?
vi w , where  ] 1 , 0 [ ? ?  is a parameter (the same for all countries) capturing the efficiency loss from 
autarchy: the lower ?, the greater the loss. The individual utility function now takes the following 
form: 
i vi i vi
OUT
vi g c g c U log + log = ) , (                         (11) 
The most preferred per capita amount of public good for an individual with income wvi is given by 
the solution to the following problem: 
 
[ ] i vi
g
g c log + log max                     (12) 
s.t.  ?
vi i vi w t c ) - 1 ( =   and gi = tiyi                           (13) 
By substituting (13) in (12), we find that the optimum per capita amount of public good is: 
2
= ) ( * i
vi i
y
w g                        (14) 
which is independent of wvi and thus is the same for all individuals in country i. Hence (14) is the 
per capita amount of public good autonomously provided by country  i. Consequently the 
equilibrium tax rate is again 0.5. An agent with income wvi receives the following payoff when her 
country is outside the union: 
i vi vi
OUT
vi y w ? w U log + log = ) ( -2log2                (15) 
An individual with income  wvi supports her country’s membership of the union when 
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vi w U is always increasing in wvi, it follows that a 
majority of individuals supports membership of the union if so does the agent with the median 
income (the median voter).  
The median voter in country i has the following utility when her country is inside the union 
u i mi
IN
mi y ß w U log + log + log = -2log2                (16) 
whereas her utility if country i is outside the union is given by: 
i mi
OUT
mi y w ? U log + log = -2log2                (17) 
Hence the median voter prefers her country to be inside the union than outside it when 
IN
mi U ? = - OUT
mi U = (1- ?)log wmi + log ßi + log yu – log yi >0          (18)   10 








? .  It is straightforward to notice that ? is increasing 
in the union’s average per capita income yu , the parameter ßi and the median voter’s income wmi  
and decreasing in country i’s average per capita income yi  and the efficiency loss parameter ?.  
A particular situation arises if we assume ?=1 and ßi =1 (no efficiency loss nor heterogeneity). 
In this case we obtain the following result: 
 
PROPOSITION 1. If ?=1 and ßi =1, a majority of country i’s citizens is in favour of membership if 
yu>yi, i.e. if country i is poorer than the union’s average.  
 
This happens because of an implicit redistribution effect in the provision (and financing) of the 
public good in the union; from (9) and (14), we find indeed that  * * > ? > i u i u g g y y . Poorer 
countries receive a higher per capita amount of public good inside the union than outside it while 
paying the same fraction of their income in taxes
9; the reverse is true for richer-than-average 
countries. Hence the difference constitutes an implicit transfer from the latter to the former. 
 
4. Econometric analysis 
 
In the last fifteen years, citizens’ support for European integration has been investigated 
empirically in a number of studies, which can be divided into two different categories, according to 
the focus of their analysis: individuals or countries. The former include the works by, among others, 
Gabel and Palmer (1995), Anderson and Reichert (1996), Anderson (1998), Gabel (1998), which 
took personal economic and social factors into account and identified systematic differences in 
individual-level support for integration related to partisanship, age, income, occupation, cognitive 
skills and political values . 
However, we are primarily interested in the latter (and less developed) strand of literature, 
because our focus too is on cross-national determinants of support. The two most prominent 
examples of this kind of studies are Eichenberg and Dalton (1993) and Anderson and Kaltenthaler 
(1996). Both used a panel data approach. Eichenberg and Dalton analysed eight countries (the 
founding members, except for Luxembourg, plus Denmark, Ireland and the UK) for the 1973-88 
period, using a number of economic and political variables to explain the dynamics of public 
support for EU membership. They found a significant effect of inflation, but not of unemployment 
                                                 
9 Remember that the tax rate is 0.5 in both cases.   11 
nor of GDP. Anderson and Kaltenthaler examined a larger number of countries (twelve) for a 
slightly longer time period (1973-93) and found that also unemployment (besides inflation) was 
significant, while GDP growth remained insignificant. Interestingly, they highlighted an upward 
trend in support; this is not surprising, because, as shown in Figure 1, the period taken into account 
ended when public support for the EU had reached its all-time high and was just starting to decline.  
The main aim of this section is not simply to update those previous studies, but to test our model 
with a view to providing a more complete and theoretically grounded picture of public support for 
the EU. According to our model, national economic conditions do influence citizens’ attitude 
towards European integration, since membership of the EU increases the efficiency of the national 
economy. Therefore, a good economic performance positively affects public support for the EU. 
We follow the previous studies in choosing three variables as basic indicators of national economic 
performance: GDP growth, unemployment rate and inflation rate. We also add public debt and 
public deficit, which, especially after the signature of the Maastricht Treaty, have become 
increasingly relevant to public opinion's eyes in determining whether the management of public 
finances is sound or poor. GDP growth is expected to exert a positive impact, whereas 
unemployment, inflation, public debt and public deficit should have a negative effect.  
However, two are the really novel elements of the model. First, it indicates that support for EU 
membership depends negatively on the ratio between national per capita income and the EU 
average one: the poorer a country (compared to the other EU members), the more positive its 
citizens’ attitude towards EU membership.   
Second, the model explicitly includes preference heterogeneity among member countries. It is 
not obvious how to measure it, hence we adopt two different strategies to do so. Firstly, we propose 
a simple measure consistent with our model, where we defined a parameter ß which captured 
heterogeneity over the provision of a public good (ß=1 meant complete homogeneity, while ß=0 
implied complete heterogeneity). By analogy with it, we take public expenditure as a proxy for the 
public good and thus construct the following indicator:  
EXPEND = (1 - |Gi-GEU|)*100                                      (19) 
defined as one minus the absolute value of the difference between the ratio of public 
expenditure to GDP in country i (Gi) and the EU average (GEU), expressed in percentage terms. It 
takes a maximum value of 100 if  Gi =  GEU; the farther the value of  Gi from that of  GEU 
(irrespective of whether it is larger or smaller), the lower EXPEND is. Since a higher degree of 
heterogeneity should reduce support for the EU, its coefficient is expected to have a negative sign. 
Secondly, we also generate a more indirect proxy variable capturing preference heterogeneity: 
we group member countries according to their date of accession to the EU and attribute each group   12 
a different score. The basic argument runs as follows. The founding states created the European 
Community, shaped its institutions and its policies (such as the Common Agricultural Policy) and 
then pressed for the advancement of the integration process after the accession of new members. 
Therefore we may assume that, among all member states, their preferences have been the most 
similar to the policies actually enacted by the EU throughout its existence.  
By contrast, public opinion was less favourably predisposed towards integration in the countries 
entering the EU in 1973
10; the "permissive consensus", mentioned in Section 2, did not exist in 
those countries, thus constraining elites’ aspirations to join early (Rabier 1989). Moreover, even 
after quite a long period of membership, they chose to opt out of some new common policies: the 
UK and Denmark have not adopted the euro and the UK and Ireland are not part of the “Schengen 
area”. The Mediterranean countries joining in the 1980s are different still: they entered late not 
because of a lack of enthusiasm for the EU as an organisation, but because they were  previously 
excluded for political reasons, since until the mid-1970s they were run by undemocratic 
governments. Finally, the 1995 enlargement brought in three countries that had previously resisted 
accession to the EU for almost forty years and whose publics have shown a very low level of 
support for EU membership; hence, their preferences are assumed to be the most different from 
those of the founding members.   
Consequently, we attribute a score of 4 to the five founding members
11, 3 to Greece, Portugal 
and Spain, 2 to Denmark, Ireland and the UK, and 1 to Austria, Finland and Sweden. The sign of 
the coefficient of this new variable (labelled ENTRY) is expected to be positive; this is analogous to 
what happened in our theoretical model, where a higher ß indicated a higher degree of preference 
homogeneity. Certainly this definition of heterogeneity is quite crude; moreover, alternative criteria 
for the division of countries into groups might b e suggested. Nevertheless, our choice seems 
consistent with the historical development of the European integration process.  
After defining the relevant variables, the estimation of the model was carried out employing two 
different panel datasets, the first comprising all EU member states (except for Luxembourg) for the 
1995-2003 period, the second covering a smaller number of countries (the five founding members, 
Denmark, Ireland and the UK), but a longer time span (1978-2003)




                                                 
10 The extreme case was Norway, which, after signing the accession treaty, rejected EU membership by referendum. 
11 Luxembourg is excluded because of its very small size. 
12 Eurobarometer data start in 1973. However, quarterly GDP figures for Denmark were only available since 1978. 
Thus, in order to have a balanced panel, our sample starts in 1978. 
13 All the results reported here were obtained using EViews 5.0.   13 
MEMBi,t = a + ß 1GROWTHi,t + ß 2UNEMPLi,t + ß 3INFLi,t + ß 4DEBTi,t + ß5DEFICITi,t +  
+ß6GDP_RATIOi,t + ß7EXPENDi,t + ß8ENTRYi + ei,t 
i=1,..,N   t=1,...,T                                                                                   (20) 
 
where  
MEMBi,t is the percentage of people supporting their country’s membership of the EU, as defined in 
Section 2;  
GROWTHi,t is the quarterly real GDP growth rate
14 in country i, in the quarter prior to that in which 
the Eurobarometer survey was conducted, expressed in percentage terms; 
UNEMPLi,t  is the unemployment rate in country  i, in the quarter prior to that in which the 
Eurobarometer survey was conducted, expressed in percentage terms; 
INFLi,t is the quarterly inflation rate
15 in country  i, in the quarter p rior to that in which the 
Eurobarometer survey was conducted, expressed in percentage terms; 
DEBTi,t is the ratio of country i’s general government consolidated gross debt to GDP in the year in 
which the Eurobarometer survey was conducted, expressed in percentage terms;  
DEFICITi,t is the ratio of country i’s general government net borrowing to GDP in the year in which 
the Eurobarometer survey was conducted, expressed in percentage terms; 
GDP_RATIOi,t is the ratio of country i’s real per capita GDP to the EU average, in the quarter prior 
to that in which the Eurobarometer survey was conducted, expressed in percentage terms; 
EXPENDi,t is the measure of heterogeneity in public expenditure defined above; 
ENTRYi (as specified above) takes a value of 4 for the five founding members, 3 for Greece, 
Portugal and Spain, 2 for Denmark, Ireland and the UK, and 1 for Austria, Finland and Sweden; 
ei,t  is the error term; 
N is the number of cross-sectional units (countries); 
T is the number of time points. 
Since the Eurobarometer surveys are carried out in spring and autumn (corresponding to the 
second and four quarter), first- and third-quarter figures were employed for GROWTH, UNEMPL, 
INFL and GDP_RATIO. Details about data sources are reported in Annex. 
Given the structure of the dataset, we had to deal with some problems in the estimation process: 
cross-sectional heteroskedasticity, contemporaneous correlations of the residuals for different cross-
                                                 
14 The model was also estimated using annual (instead of quarterly) GDP growth rates, obtaining very similar results. 
15 Measured as the consumer price index (CPI) growth rate.   14 
sectional units
16 and autocorrelated residuals within each time series. A strategy frequently followed 
in the political economic literature is the application of a feasible generalised least squares (FGLS) 
estimator, which corrects, on the one hand, for both cross-section heteroskedasticity and 
contemporaneous correlations, and, on the other hand, for autocorrelations of the errors by 
assuming that they follow a first-order autoregressive process (AR(1)):  
ei,t = siei,t-1+ ui,t    |s i|<1                              (21) 
This methodology was firstly proposed by Parks (1967) and is often referred to as the Parks 
estimator (see Greene 2003 for more details). However, it presents a potentially severe pitfall: Beck 
and Katz (1995) show that, unless T is much larger than N, the FGLS methodology tends to 
strongly underestimate the true variability of the estimator. Consequently, this produces highly 
overconfident standard errors and, therefore, t-ratios are much higher than the correct value. They 
suggest a different strategy: first, use OLS and the appropriate covariance matrix to obtain standard 
errors which are robust to contemporaneous correlations as well as different error variances in each 
cross-section (labelled “panel corrected standard errors”); second, impose the restriction of equal 
autocorrelation coefficients across units (si=s for all i).  
Hence we estimated Equation (20) for the EU-14, where T=16 and N=14, by pooled OLS with 
panel corrected standard errors (following the Beck and Katz methodology) and an AR(1) 
correction. For the EU-8 equation, where T=50 and N=8, we employed both this methodology and 
(since in this case T is actually much larger than N) a FGLS specification correcting for both cross-
section heteroskedasticity and contemporaneous correlations of the errors
17. The latter approach is 
also very similar to that adopted by Eichenberg and Dalton (1993) and Anderson and Kaltenthaler 
(1996) and thus may facilitate a comparison with their findings.  
The results for the EU-14 clearly confirm our theoretical predictions (Table 3). Both the positive 
impact of economic growth and the negative one of unemployment are significant, even if the latter 
is stronger than the former, as shown by a comparison of their standard errors. Inflation does not 
seem to be of concern for the European public opinion, probably because it has permanently been 
low throughout the period considered in our analysis. Economic growth and unemployment are thus 
the variables of the business cycle that matter most in citizens’ view. By contrast, price stability 
appears to be taken for granted, even if one may argue that its achievement has represented 
precisely one of the main successes of economic integration, through monetary policy coordination 
in the European Monetary System and the three phases of the European Monetary Union, leading to 
                                                 
16 By contemporaneous correlations, we mean that the residuals for unit i at time t are correlated with the residuals for 
unit j at time t. In our context, a relevant example could be a similar business cycle between two or more EU countries. 
17 This specification is termed “Cross-section SUR” by EViews, because it is analogous to a seemingly unrelated 
regressions (SUR) framework. The AR(1) correction with a common s is retained.   15 
a single monetary policy run by the ECB for most EU members since 1999. Public debt seems to 
matter more than public deficit to European citizens: the negative effect of the former is significant 
(even if not very large), whilst that of the latter is not. As shown in Table 3, we estimated Equation 
(20) with both EXPEND and ENTRY and with only one of them at a time. There are no 
considerable differences among the three specifications. The degree of preference homogeneity has 
a strongly positive effect on support for membership, confirming the predictions of the theoretical 
model.  
<Table 3 here> 
The coefficient of GDP_RATIO is negative and highly significant: ceteris paribus, the poorer a 
country the higher its support for the EU, as we expected. This may happen because of the 
redistribution enacted by the EU budget in favour of the less developed members to promote the 
goal of economic and social cohesion by means of the Structural Funds.
18 Indeed, allocation of EU 
expenditure has become one of the most delicate issues in intergovernmental negotiations, even if 
the EU budget is equal to only 1.1-1.2% of its total GNP, because “winners” and “losers” can be 
easily identified on the basis of the difference between benefits received from EU budget and 
contributions paid to it (Laffan and Shackleton 2000).  
We may test this hypothesis directly, by replacing the variable GDP_RATIO in Equation (20) 
with a new variable BALANCE, defined as a country’s benefits from minus contributions to the EU 
budget, expressed as a percentage of GNP. In this case, we should expect a positive sign for the 
BALANCE coefficient, since poorer countries are generally net beneficiaries. The results shown in 
Table 4 fully corroborate our hypothesis.  
<Table 4 here> 
With regard to the EU-8 equation for the 1978-2003 period (Tables 5 and 6)
19, we may first 
notice that both the OLS and the FGLS specifications yield qualitatively and quantitatively similar 
results; the main difference is just the value of the UNEMPL coefficient, which is quite larger (in 
absolute value) in the former than in the latter. Second, our model performs well in the long run too, 
with some interesting differences in comparison with the previous EU-14 case. Economic 
conditions are still important, but now inflation is the most significant of these variables, whereas 
GDP growth and public debt exert no effect on support for the EU. Unemployment remains 
significant at 5% level. These findings are similar to those of Anderson and Kaltenthaler (1996) for 
the 1973-1993 period, where inflation and unemployment were significant, but economic growth 
was not. By contrast, Eichenberg and Dalton (1993) found that only inflation was significant, but 
                                                 
18 For a detailed presentation and discussion on the Structural Funds, see, for instance, Allen (2000). 
19 The DEFICIT variable is not included in these regressions because data for some countries were not available for the 
whole period.   16 
they used a slightly different definition of the dependent variable
20 and, as mentioned above, their 
analysis focused on a shorter period (1973-1988).   
It is not surprising that inflation plays a relevant role in shaping mass support for the EU over 
the extended time period, because economic policy in the late 1970s and the 1980s exhibited a 
strong anti-inflationary stance all over Western Europe, and also at the EC level through the 
creation of the EMS. Hence we may argue that citizens seemed to share the concern of their 
governments about price stability after the stagflation phenomenon in the 1970s. 
Another difference compared with the EU-14 results is the insignificance of EXPEND and 
ENTRY (both when employed one at a time and together), which suggests that heterogeneity of 
preferences becomes relevant only when a larger number of countries is included in the analysis. 
That is to say, subsequent enlargement rounds (especially the 1995 one) have made the EU more 
diverse and only in the last few years such increased heterogeneity has affected support for EU 
membership. On the contrary, the coefficient of GDP_RATIO is still negative and significant, 
which implies that, ceteris paribus, support for the EU is higher in poorer member countries.   
<Tables 5 and 6 here> 
 
5. Citizens’ response to economic performance: what implications for the European 
Constitution and the enlargement process? 
 
We can draw some policy implications from our analysis. Firstly, the timing of national 
referenda on EU issues  affects their chance of success. Ceteris paribus, if a country holds a 
referendum when its economic growth is sluggish and its unemployment is high, it will be more 
likely to see a majority of citizens voting against further integration. This is consistent with the 
experience of the recent referenda in France and the Netherlands, where citizens have rejected the 
European Constitution: according to Eurostat figures, the unemployment rate in France reached 
9.8% in April 2005 and quarterly real GDP growth in the Netherlands was –0.1% in the first quarter 
of 2005
21. Unfortunately, national policymakers have little freedom for choice in this respect, 
because EU treaties usually indicate a date for their entry into force and referenda can only be held 
during a period starting after the signature of the treaty and ending before the envisaged date of 
entry into force. For instance, the European Constitution should have been ratified by 1 November 
2006, two years after its signature; the first referendum took place in February 2005 in Spain, while 
                                                 
20 Instead of absolute support for EU membership, they employed net support (percentage of citizens in favour of 
membership minus percentage of citizens against it). 
21 The Netherlands also pays the largest net contribution to the EU budget in percentage of GNP (0.43% in 2003), 
corresponding to roughly 120€ per capita.   17 
the last ones were originally scheduled in the UK and the Czech Republic in spring 2006. In such a 
short time span, economic conditions are not very likely to change dramatically. The only really 
effective tool at government’s disposal is choosing parliamentary ratification instead, provided that 
a referendum is not compulsory according to national constitutional rules, because, as Moravcsik 
(1994) argued with regard to the near rejection of the Maastricht Treaty in France, ‘referenda on 
international issues are likely to be risky’ (p.59). 
 Secondly, it appears quite clear that, in order to boost public support, the EU should 
concentrate its activity on policies promoting economic growth and fighting unemployment. 
However, the picture is complicated by the fact that many elements of economic policy still remain 
of national competence, even if member states have to coordinate their economic policies.
22 At 
present, EU countries are engaged in the so-called Lisbon Strategy, launched  at the Lisbon 
European Council in 2000, aiming at making the EU ‘the most competitive and dynamic 
knowledge-based economy in the world, capable of sustainable economic growth with more and 
better jobs and greater social cohesion’ (European Council 2000).  
So far the outcome has been disappointing and in 2005 the European Commission proposed a 
revision of the Lisbon Strategy, giving a higher priority to growth and employment (European 
Commission 2005). However, its implementation still depends on how seriously national 
governments take their commitments. EU institutions should then focus their activity on areas 
where they can really exert a strong impact, namely the single market. Indeed, according to the 
words of the European Constitution, the Union has ‘exclusive competence’ on ‘the establishing of 
the competitions rules necessary for the functioning of the internal market’ (Art. I-13), while the 
internal market as a whole is an area of ‘shared competence’ (Art. I-14), which means that ‘the 
Member States shall exercise their competence to the extent that the Union has not exercised, or has 
decided to cease exercising, its competence’ (Art. I-12).   
The most topical issue in the internal market area is the liberalisation of trade in services, which 
account for roughly 70% of jobs in the EU. A real single market for services has not been 
established yet, because numerous sectors still hide, de facto, behind national barriers. In 2004 the 
Commission proposed a directive (usually referred to as ‘services directive’) precisely aiming at 
abolishing those barriers. According to an  independent study, the liberalisation of services could 
create up to 600,000 new jobs and add €33 billion a year to EU GDP (Copenhagen Economics 
2005), giving a relevant contribution to the relaunch of the Lisbon Strategy. However, in March 
2005 the European Council did not endorse the proposed directive and invited the Commission to 
redraft it, by stating that: 
                                                 
22 See European Commission (2002) for details on the procedures for coordination of economic policies in the EU.   18 
 
‘In order to promote growth and employment and to strengthen competitiveness, the internal 
market of services has to be fully operational while preserving the European social model. 
[...][The] ongoing debate [...] shows that the directive as it is currently drafted does not fully 
meet these requirements’ (European Council 2005, p.7). 
 
Indeed, the strongest opposition to the services directive came from France (followed by 
Germany), that feared a risk of “social dumping”, in which competition from poorer EU countries 
would drive down French welfare standards and could trigger a wave of job losses for French 
nationals (Gros 2005). The most interesting feature of the story is that rejection of the services 
directive was linked to the referendum on the European Constitution that France was going to hold 
in May 2005: preservation of the “European social model”, allegedly threatened by the proposed 
liberalisation in the services sector, was perceived by the French government as one of the elements 
able to persuade the French people to vote in favour of the Constitution (Franck 2005)
23. Therefore, 
a policy measure which could boost economic growth and employment over the next few years and 
consequently increase public support for the EU in the long run, has faced opposition because in the 
short run it is deemed to be very unpopular and may worsen the image of the EU in people’s eyes.  
In terms of government popularity, the trade-off between long-term benefits and short-term 
costs of economic reforms is well known at the national level, but this paper suggests that a similar 
trade-off is relevant also at the EU level, in terms of support for the integration process. The main 
difference is that in the former case citizens may vote against the government at the following 
election, while in the latter they can only express their discontent by voting a gainst further 
integration when (and if) a referendum on EU issues is held in their country. 
Finally, looking at the future of public opinion support for the EU, we may use our model to 
make some tentative predictions about the impact of the 2004 enlargement, which brought in eight 
central and eastern European countries (CEECs), plus Cyprus and Malta. According to our analysis, 
on the one hand heterogeneity of preferences should increase, since public expenditure in the new 
member states is generally much lower than the EU average
24; this would negatively affect the level 
of mass support for EU membership. On the other, the new members are much poorer than the EU 
average (thus they should be large net beneficiaries from the EU budget) and are enjoying much 
higher GDP growth rates. According to Eurostat figures, in 2004 per capita GDP among the CEECs 
                                                 
23 An opinion poll conducted by TNS-Sofres on the referendum day in France actually found that the most frequently 
mentioned reason for voting “No” was precisely that ‘the Treaty will worsen unemployment in France’ (see 
http://www.tns-sofres.com). 
24 According to Eurostat, in 2004 the average public expenditure in the ten new member states was 42.7% of GDP 
whereas the EU-25 average equalled 47.7%.   19 
ranged from 78% of EU average in Slovenia to 44% in Latvia, while growth in 2004 varied from 
8.3% in Latvia to 4.2% in Hungary and Slovenia and in 2005 it is forecast to range from 9.1% in 
Latvia to 3.4% in Poland. These two features should boost support for the EU in the CEECs.
25 The 
net effect could therefore be ambiguous and only in the next few years one could determine whether 
it is positive or negative.  
 
6. Concluding remarks 
 
In this paper we firstly proposed a model of citizens’ support for membership of international 
unions, with explicit reference to the EU. The core of the model is the existence of a trade-off 
between the advantages of centralising the provision of public goods and the heterogeneity in 
preferences among countries. Subsequently we tested the model on a panel of EU countries. The 
findings were consistent with our theoretical expectations: the conditions of the national economy, 
differences in income among member states and heterogeneity of preferences shape citizens’ 
attitude towards their country’s membership of the EU. Consequently, this analysis offers some 
interesting policy implications for the present debate about ratification of the European Constitution 
and, more generally, about how the EU could act in order to gain more support from the European 
public. The broad conclusion which we can draw is that the reaction of the Europeans to the 
advance of the integration process does not seem to be a priori either positive or negative. It may 
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Annex. Data Sources 
 
Variable  Source 
MEMB  European Commission, Eurobarometer surveys, various issues.  
GROWTH  OECD, Economic Outlook, No 75. Figures for Denmark are from Eurostat New Cronos 
database. All data are expressed at 1995 prices.  
UNEMPL  OECD, Economic Outlook, No 75.  
INFL  IMF, International Financial Statistics 
DEBT  Eurostat, Government Statistics 
DEFICIT  See DEBT 
GDP_RATIO  See GROWTH 
BALANCE  European Commission, Annual Report on Allocated Expenditure, various issues 
EXPEND  See DEBT   22 
Table 1. Referenda on European Issues in Member States  
Treaty/Policy  Country  Year  Ratified (R)/Not Ratified 
(NR) 
Single European Act  Denmark  1986  R 
  Ireland  1987  R 
Maastricht  Denmark I  1992  NR 
  France  1992  R 
  Ireland  1992  R 
  Denmark II  1993  R 
Amsterdam  Denmark  1998  R 
  Ireland  1998  R 
Nice  Ireland I  2001  NR 
  Ireland II  2002  R 
Accession to the EU  Austria  1994  R 
  Finland  1994  R 
  Norway  1994  NR 
  Sweden  1994  R 
  Czech Republic  2003  R 
  Estonia  2003  R 
  Hungary  2003  R 
  Latvia  2003  R 
  Lithuania  2003  R 
  Malta  2003  R 
  Poland  2003  R 
  Slovakia  2003  R 
  Slovenia  2003  R 
Adoption of the Euro  Denmark  2000  NR 
  Sweden  2003  NR 
European Constitution  France  2005  NR 
  Luxembourg  2005  R 
  Netherlands  2005  NR 
  Spain  2005  R 
Source: European Commission 
   23 
 
Table 2. Referenda on Accession to the EU since the 1990s 
Country  Year  Ratified (R)/Not Ratified (NR) 
Austria    1994  R 
Finland  1994  R 
Norway  1994  NR 
Sweden  1994  R 
Czech Republic  2003  R 
Estonia  2003  R 
Hungary  2003  R 
Latvia  2003  R 
Lithuania  2003  R 
Malta  2003  R 
Poland  2003  R 
Slovakia  2003  R 
Slovenia  2003  R 
Source: European Commission   24 
 
Table 3. Determinants of public opinion support for EU membership in the EU-14: regression 
results, 1995-2003 
 
Dependent Variable: MEMBERSHIP 












































































Adjusted R-squared  0.899  0.899  0.901 
s  0.806  0.822  0.812 
N observations  224  224  224 
F-statistic  86.354  91.955  88.820 
* significant at 5% level 
**significant at 1% level 
 
Source: author's calculations   25 
 
Table 4. Determinants of public opinion support for EU membership in the EU-14: regression 
results, 1995-2003 
Dependent Variable: MEMBERSHIP 












































































Adjusted R-squared  0.893  0.903  0.905 
S  0.856  0.843  0.872 
N observations  224  224  224 
F-statistic  85.869  95.932  93.638 
* significant at 5% level 
**significant at 1% level 
Source: author's calculations 
   26 
Table 5.  Determinants of public opinion support for EU membership in the EU-8: regression 
results, 1978-2003 
Dependent Variable: MEMBERSHIP 




































































Adjusted R-squared  0.899  0.899  0.899 
s  0.796  0.781  0.778 
N observations  400  400  400 
F-statistic  255.161  256.747  239.072 
* significant at 5% level 
** significant at 1% level 
 
Source: author's calculations   27 
 
Table 6.  Determinants of public opinion support for EU membership in the EU-8: regression 
results, 1978-2003 





































































Adjusted R-squared  0.926  0.926  0.927 
s  0.857  0.865  0.822 
N observations  400  400  400 
F-statistic  1252.968  1249.245  1169.618 
* significant at 5% level 
**significant at 1% level 
 
Source: author's calculations   28 
Figure 1. Support for and benefit from EU membership according to the Eurobarometer opinion 






































































































































































Year (A=Autumn Issue; S=Spring Issue)
%
Support for Membership Benefit from Membership
 
“Support for Membership” = % of people answering “a good thing” to the following question: ‘Generally speaking, do 
you think that [your country’s] membership of the European Community/European Union is “a good thing”, “a bad 
thing”, “neither good nor bad”?’ 
“Benefit from Membership” = % of people responding “has benefited” to the following question: ‘Taking everything 
into consideration, would you say that [your country] has on balance benefited or not from being a member of the 
European Community/European Union?’ 
 
Source: Standard Eurobarometer, various issues 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 